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Article 6

ARTICLES

On Lying For Clients
Thomas L. Shaffer*
I am happy I was given the privilege of meddling with impunity in
other peoples affairs without really doing any harm by belonging to that
avocation whose acolytes have been absolved in advance for holding justice above truth I have been denied the chance to destroy what I loved by
touching it
-Gavin Stevens'
"I'm interested in truth," the sheriff said.
"So am I," Uncle Gavin said. "It's so rare. But I am more interested
injustice and human beings."
"Ain't truth and justice the same thing?" the sheriff said.
"Since when?" Uncle Gavin said. "In my time I have seen truth that
was anything under the sun but just, and I have seen justice using tools
and instruments I wouldn't want to touch with a ten-foot fence rail .... "2
'What book is that in?" [the sheriff said]....
"It's in all of them.... The good ones, I mean."
-William Faulkner3
For all of his occasional resort to deceit and falsehood, Faulkner's
county-seat, Southern-gentleman lawyer, Gavin Stevens, was a virtuous person, a good person, and a truthful person. He and other moral worthies in
good stories-many of them lawyers-have something to contribute to discussions, in legal ethics, on the issue of lying for clients.
In negative terms, such American lawyer stories suggest a turn away
from analysis of duty and consequence, of critical moments and "ethical
dilemmas" and statements and dry rationality. Cleanth Brooks said of Faulkner's lawyer stories that it is the villains in them who are rational: "The
* Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame; Supervising
Attorney, Notre Dame Legal Aid Clinic. I am grateful for the assistance of Alexzandrea Barrau,
G. Robert Blakey, Carrie DiSanto, Herbert Fingarette, Monroe H. Freedman, Linda Harrington,
Kent Hull, Stephen L. Pepper, Robert E. Rodes, Jr., NancyJ. Shaffer, and John Howard Yoder.
This was prepared for the conference "Legal Ethics: The Core Issues," at the Hofstra
University School of Law, March, 1996. It is used here with the kind permission of the organizers
and sponsors of that conference.
1 Wxu.iAM FAULKNER, THE MANSION 363 (Vintage Books 1959).
2 WiuiAM FAULKNER, An Error in Chemistry, in KNIGHT'S GAMBrr 111 (Random House 1949).
Not all of Gavin's preference was vicarious and professional. His recurrent client in THE TowN
and THE MANSION, Linda Snopes Cole, once said to him: "I love you ...because every time you
lie to me I can always know you will stick to it." FAULKNER, supranote 1, at 175.
3 FAULKNER, KNIGHT'S GAMBrr, supra note 2, at 131.
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good man," he said, "has to 4transcend his mere intellect with some overflow of generosity and love."

What stories have to say about lying for clients seems useful just now,
when the despairing suggestion in both popular discourse and learned discussion is that a person cannot practice law truthfully. "How do you tell
when a lawyer is lying?" the joke asks. Answer: "When his lips are moving."
The average American lies thirteen times a week; lawyers lie more often. 5
Grim jokes about dishonest lawyers are, of course, old stuff in American culture. What is new is the plea of guilty from academic lawyers who
ponder the morals of law practice. Professor Lisa Lerman told us, five years
ago, on what appeared to be a sound clinical basis, that we modem American lawyers routinely lie to our clients-to get business, to keep business, to
make money. Her moral assessment was to disapprove of lying for "direct"
gain but to tell us that we have to accept a certain amount of it as part of
representing clients. 6 Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow, also talking mostly
about lying to clients, proposed what is in part a response to Professor
Lerman's moral guideline: Don't lie if, in the circumstances, you would
7
not want to be lied to, she said.
Several legal educators trace this admission that lawyers cannot be
truthful to broad vocational sources:
-to the emphasis the professional tradition puts on civility, and a
traditional tendency to euphemism, so that we do not know a lie when we
see one;
-to fraternal loyalty, and lawyers' reluctance to punish their dishonest colleagues; 8
-to the "Socratic method" in law teaching, 9 the practitioners of which
were told, long ago, by Karl Llewellyn, to treat ethics, social policy, and
their students' sense of justice as "woozy thinking"' 0-so that the person
Dean Anthony Kronman sees as the good law teacher"1 is determined to
subvert the moral instincts of her students and to arrest moral development at Lawrence Kohlberg's fourth level of moral development (on a
12
scale of six);
-to modem clinical skills training in law school, particularly to training in the art of negotiation with other lawyers, where deception is said to
4
5

CLEANTH BROOKS, William Faulkner: Vuion of Good and Evi4 in THE HIDDEi GOD 41 (1963).
Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. Ray. 659 (1990).

6

Id

7 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lying to ClientsforEconomic Gain or PaternalisticJudgment:A Proposalfor a Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 761, 764 (1990).
8 Frederick Miller, Commentary: "If You Can't Trust Your Lawyer.... ..
138 U. PA. L. REv.
785, 785 (1990) (as to both points).
9 See generally Paul G. Haskell, TeachingMoral Analysis in Law School, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV.

1025 (1991).

10

KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 101 (1951).
See generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993).

11

12

LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF

IDEA OFJUSTICE 18 (1981).
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be essential and professional regulation distinguishes falsehood from tell13
ing lies.
Immanuel Kant, maybe the greatest of all practitioners of ethical analysis, could not find an analysis of moral duty that would justify lying to a
ruffian who appeared to be bent on murdering somebody. 14 Shirley
Letwin, who deals with ethics in stories, considers Anthony Trollope's Victorian English gentlemen-many of whom were lawyers-and says that a
gentleman will lie to protect his friend. But a gentleman, she said, will not
pretend that he has not lied. 15 What Letwin did was to suggest meaning,
rather than a principled analysis, and that is, I think, a useful thing to do in
ethics. The meaning I suppose one might find in Trollope is in the connection between "good person" (Letwin said "gentleman") and "friend." I
have tended (elsewhere) to dare a bit, and have suggested that the moral
tradition Americans inherit accounts for the morals of good people by reference
to relationships among good people and friendship in communities,' 6 that is, by reference to friends, as Letwin says, but with the
understanding (which Trollope had, and Aristotle, 17 too) that communities rest on friendship.
Stories are a way to search for meaning in morals; in the present case
the meaning in stories about good people who lie.' 8 When Charles Curtis,
who pondered our problem half a century ago, could not find a satisfactory
ethical analysis, he looked for a story. He finally located three stories from
his rich career in law practice, and he seemed to think he had found meaning, although he despaired of analysis: "The relation between a lawyer and
his client," he wrote, after telling three stories, "is one of the intimate rela18 Geoffrey M. Peters, The Use of Lies in Negotiation, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 1 (1987). 1 am purposely
not preserving a distinction between deceit and lying, although I will occasionally mention the
distinction, which has a lofty provenance. See my discussion of negotiation, SHAFFER, infra note
17, at 850-61.
14 Immanuel Kant, On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives, reprinted in SISSELA BoK,
LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBUC AND PRvATE LIFE 285-90 (First Vintage Books 1979) (1978).
15

SHIRLEY ROBIN LETWIN, THE GENTLEMAN IN TROLLOPE: INDIVIDUALrIY AND MORAL CONDUCT

72 (1982).
16 My daughter Mary and I explored the notion at great length in our book: THOMAS L.
SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1991).
17 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Eight excerpted in part in THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN
LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND DISCUSSION TOPICS 149-51 (1985);John M. Cooper, Aristotle
on the Forms ofFiendship,80 Rrv. METAPHYSICS 619 (1977);John M. Cooper, Friendshipand the Good
in Aristotle, 86 PHIL REv. 290 (1977); see also GILBERT MEILAENDER, FRIENDSHIP: A STUDY IN THEOLOGICAL ETHICS 69-84 (1981).
18 The method is Aristotelian, in what I hope is a commonsensical, lawyer's use of the tradition. Aristotle contemplated the good person. He then reflected on the dispositions, habits, and
virtues that combine to make the good person a good person. What good stories do is to present
for ethical reflection, through the extraordinary talent and insight of a storyteller, a good person.
And then lesser folk (legal scholars even) contemplate what is presented to them by the storytellers, and, among other things, do what Aristotle did: describe the good habits the storyteller
shows them in her good person-particularly, in the present instance, the virtues of friendship
and truthfulness.
I attempted tojustify the method, and to illustrate it, in THOMAS L. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE
PROFESSIONS (1987), there depending heavily on JAMES W. MCCLENDON, BIOGRAPHY AS THEOLOGY
(1974), STANLEY HAUERWAS, TRUTHFULNESS AND TRAGEDY (1977) and STANLEY HAUERWAS, VISION
AND VIRTUE: ESSAYS IN CHRISTIAN ETHICAL REFLECTION (1974). The method is dependent on the
insight of storytellers. I point to stories (as in this essay). In that way, I use stories; I lack the
ability to tell stories.
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tions. You would lie for your wife. You would lie for your child. There are
others with whom you are intimate enough, close enough, to lie for them

when you would not lie for yourself. At what point do you stop lying for
them? I don't know and you are not sure." 19
One of Curtis's stories was about a sailor on watch who went off on a
20
"frolic of his own."

While he was gone from his watch his ship collided with another ship.
The collision was not caused by the sailor's neglect; the ships would have
run into one another anyway. But his shipmates and his captain expected
him to lie about the frolic. They wanted him to say he had been on duty
when the ships collided. The sailor refused to lie, but no one-not even
Charles Curtis-admired him for his stubborn adherence to what ap21
peared to be a moral principle against telling lies.
In the second story, a lawyer lied to save his client from disgrace. The

lawyer stuck to his false story through thick and thin and eventually suf22
fered regulatory discipline for it. Curtis refused to disapprove of him.
The third story is more like Kant's dilemma: The lawyer there lied about
the whereabouts of his client, who was a fugitive from justice, but who

needed a couple of days to wind up his affairs before he turned himself
in.23 Curtis applauded that lawyer, and then rendered the conclusion I
quoted above.
19 Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REv. 3, 8 (1951), reprinted in SHAFFER,
supra note 17, at app. § 13.1.
20 The test, as I learned it from an old English case in a first-year agency course, was between
the liability of the "master" for what the "servant" does in the master's behalf, and acts for which
the "servant" only is liable. Joel v. Morison, 172 Eng. Rep. 1338 (Ex. 1834) (Parke, B.).
21 Curtis, supra note 19, at 6. When the captain and crew were with lawyers, preparing for
trial:
Captain: "You, of course were up in the eyes on the forecastle keeping a sharp lookout."
Sailor: "The truth is, Captain, I was in the head having a smoke."
Captain (to the lawyers): "That's all right, gentlemen, he'll testify that he was keeping a
sharp lookout. Won't you, Sam?"
Sailor: "No.... I guess I can't do that."
Id.
And then (Curtis):
[S]uch a storm of indignation burst over Sam as he had never seen. The Captain and
the rest of the crew cursed him for betraying his ship. Let him go to the head if he had
to. Let him even have his smoke if he must. But when he did let him also take the
consequences. The collision was not his fault, they agreed. The fog was too thick for
him to have seen the other vessel in time, but was he now going to let his own ship
down? If he left his post on his own affairs, he had no right to make the ship pay the
penalty. What if it was perjury? He'd taken that risk. Not the ship, but he had taken the
risk of perjury.
Id. at 6-7.
22 Curtis, supra note 19, at 7.
I was secretary of the Grievance Committee of the Bar Association at the time, and I was
trying to find out whether this man [the client who was being protected] had been
blackmailed by some other lawyers. I went to this lawyer and asked him. If he had even
admitted to me that he had represented this man, I should have been pretty sure that
the man had indeed been blackmailed ....
The lawyer told me he did not even know
the man.
Id.
23 Id- at 8.
The lawyer goes to where his client is, hears the whole story, and advises him to surrender.... [T]hey make an appointment to go to police headquarters. Meanwhile the

1996]

ON LYING FOR CLIENTS

I don't think it is a pity that Curtis didn't attempt to analyze these
statements, or attempt to round off his stories with a principle. These were
cases of lawyers lying to protect their friends, and of a sailor who should
have lied to protect his friends.' Letwin said such a person might nonetheless be a gentleman, but she did not offer a principle either. She said, by
way of understanding Trollope's stories, that a gentleman will lie to protect
his friend; she did not say when he should lie, or when he should not, or
what the difference is as a matter of analysis. What she did was look at the
stories and underline the fact that a good person will lie sometimes. And
then she, like Trollope,2 4 approved of what the good person did.
None of Trollope's or Curtis's stories-stories of good people telling
lies-is unusual in the Hebraic moral tradition most American lawyers are
formed in, but the tradition is not exactly comfortable with such stories
either. It ponders them, at least as much as Letwin pondered the stories of
Trollope before she concluded that a gentleman who lies will not pretend
he has not lied. In my assessment, the moral masters who have preserved
these stories for us are concerned about doing two things: First, they are
concerned about avoiding an analytical, abstract, negative, universal rule
against deceiving others. Second, they are concerned about the corruption
of character and community that is the result of lies, and particularly about
the social and professional self-deception that makes lies routine and saves
liars from shame and guilt.
In the Bible, Elisha lies to save himself and the city from the Syrian
army. The Syrians were after Elisha. They wanted to kill him, but they
could not recognize him because the Lord had struck them blind. Elisha
said to the Syrians, 'You are on the wrong road; this is not the town you are
looking for. Follow me, and I will lead you to the man you are after." They
followed him, and he
led them away from the city and into the midst of
25
their enemy's army.

One way to cope with Elisha's lie is to say that it was not a lie. It was, to
be sure, deceptive, but analytically the statement was true: Elisha did indeed lead them to the man they sought; and, indeed, if they stayed on that
road and went into the city they aimed for they would not find Elisha there,
client is to have two days to wind up his affairs and make his farewells. When the lawyer
gets back to his office, a police inspector is waiting for him, and asks him whether his
client is in town and where he is.... Of course he lies.
And why not?

id-

24 LETWiN, supra note 15, at 71-72. The quality of honesty Letwin admired had three dimensions: (i) clarity about one's own knowledge, (ii) congruence (i.e., objectivity about one's integrity), and (iii) awareness of the character of those with whom one is dealing. Karl Rahner was
more strident:
[A]s to what one must actually do, what the real content of life is, the moralizers leave us
none the wiser. They seem intent on restricting our lives; they point out the ditches on
the right-and on the left-hand side of the road; but what our life and work really are,
what contents our hearts, they do not say. All these rules, these prescriptions, all this
scolding, these warnings always being volunteered by unenlightened, petty-minded
pedagogues and educators do not tell us what is to be done, where our heart and mind
are to find fulfillment in this life on earth.
KARL RAHNER, THE GREAT CHURCH YEAR 273 (Albert Raffelt ed. & Harvey D. Egan trans., Crossroad 1993) (1987).
25 2 Kings 6:18-20.
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because he did not plan to be there. If the Syrians were deceived by a true
statement, the moral issue was not about a lie (statement), but about deception through truthful statements-a different issue. As to either issuewhether Elisha lied or merely deceived-it is relevant to ask whether the
person asking the question was entitled to the truth. Since God was on
Elisha's side in that story, the answer is no. That way of reasoning-which I
admit to having borrowed and used elsewhere 2 6-is an example of the
analysis I propose to avoid: I think Elisha told a lie. The meaning of the
story has to take the lie into account, but not without careful consideration
of the person who told the lie and of the rest of his story.
Elisha, chosen by God to be successor to the prophet Elijah, was a
miracle worker, a peace-maker, and a healer, as well as a court prophet and
a wise and virtuous person. He was the sort of person who is expected to
do wise and virtuous things.2 7 It helps in that regard, as part of fitting his
deception into his life, to notice that Elisha's misleading the Syrian army
saved their lives:
After Elisha led them to the wrong city: When the King of Israel saw
the Syrians, he asked Elisha, "Shall I kill them, sir? Shall I kill them?"
"No," he answered. "Not even soldiers you had captured in combat
would be put to death. Give them something to eat and drink, and let
them return to their king." So the King of Israel provided a great feast
for them; and after they had eaten and drunk, he sent them back to the
King of Syria.

28

In a second biblical example (there are many others), Rebekah, matriarch of Israel, and her son Jacob lie to their husband and father Isaac, who,
having been lied to, blesses the younger son Jacob instead of the elder son
Esau.29 Modern commentators, some of them lawyers, focus more on Jacob's behavior than on Rebekah's, notably with the legal argument that
Jacob was only after what he had already obtained by contract from his
brother, 30 or with the moral-historical argument that Esau was an unworthy
scoundrel, and that what was at issue, after all, was a commission as the
Father of Israel. 3 1 Some of this modem commentary on Jacob is unsound;
all of it is tendentious. I suspect that its tendentiousness is caused by the
fact that the commentators strain for an analytical principle. 32 It is proba26 THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN,JR., LAwyERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILrry 86-87 (1994) (quoting to this effectJOHN MURRAY, PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT: ASPECTS OF BIBLICAL ETHICS 142-43 (2d prtg. 1964)).

27 4 MIDRASH RABBAH, Leviticus 347 (Judah J. Slotki trans., 3d ed. 1983). He was a miracle
worker who prayed for (and apparently received) a double share of the spirit of Elijah. 2 Kings
2:9. He made foul water wholesome, bitter soup palatable, an axe-head float on water. He multiplied drops of oil and loaves of bread to feed the hungry, cured leprosy, and brought the dead to
life. 2 Kings 4, 5.

28
29
30

2 Kings 6:21-22.
Genesis 27.
Genesis 25:31-34. NAHUM M. SARNA, THEJPS TORAH COMMENTARY. GENESIS 189 (1989).
31 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, 3 SEDER NEZIKIN, Sanhedrin 688 (H. Freedman, trans., Quin. ed.
1978) [hereinafter SONCINO TALMUD]; DAVID WERNER AMRAM, LEADING CASES IN THE BIBLE 74
(1905); CALUM M. CARMICHAEL, LAw AND NARRATIVE IN THE BIBLE 146-50 (1985).
32

AmRAM, supra note 31, at 74, is an example.
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say ofJacob that he was wrong but he was young and he got
bly enough to
33
better later.
Rebekah is the more interesting character for present purposes. She
was older, her virtues more firmly fixed. She was a good person, chosen by
God to be Isaac's wife, and to be one of the four matriarchs of Israel. She
and her mother-in-law Sarah, and her daughters-in-law Rachel and Leah
are, in rabbinical tradition, sources of merit for all of Israel; it was due to
their merit that the Lord led Israel out of slavery in Egypt. They, and especially Rebekah, are prophets: The Holy Spirit spoke directly to Rebekahmore than once. They are exemplars in prayer, in blessing, and in hospitality.34 In the Yiddish liturgy the prayerful Jew thanks the Lord because
"our mother Rivke .

.

. caused our father Yankev to receive the blessings

from the father Yitskhok," and prays that her merit may cause "the blessings to be fulfilled soon through her children Yisroel." 35
The meaning of Rebekah's lie is the meaning to be found in her life
and mission, and that had to do with her life of devotion to her family-all
generations of it-a family of families-and to protecting her family both
from a harmful person and the harmful rule of law that placed too much
power in a first-born son and made irrevocable a father's ill-considered testamentary gesture. 86 Rebekah's lie resembles, as to both points, the lies
told by Abraham and by Isaac, to strangers they perceived as hostile, when
they said the women they had married were their sisters rather than their
wives.

37

The Rabbis who focused on the act more than on the life, justified
Rebekah's lie, first of all, by noting that she was carrying out the will of the
Lord Who had told her that her elder son, Esau, would serve her younger
son, Jacob. 38 Some faint rabbinical analysis suggests that Isaac was not
deceived anyway; he knew all along the notion being that a lie is not a lie
if no one is deceived by it.39 In any case, Isaac ratified his own act later,
when he knew what he was doing, by blessingJacob. 40 But he did not pretend that he had not been lied to.
Rebekah's story has more meaning-as Elisha's story does-if you
don't try to bleach the lie out of it. The important thing about both of"
those biblical stories, for present purposes, and taking a somewhat different tack than the commentaries do, is that in each of them an admirable
33 L- at 67; SARNA, supra note 30, at 191, 897-98; SONcINo TALMUD,
NEZIKUN, Makoth, at 170 (H.M. Lazarus, trans.).

supranote 31,

4 SEDER

34 Alvan Kaunfer, Who Knows Four? The Imahot in RabbinicJudaism, 44JUDAISM 94, 99 (1995);
see a/sojoan Comay, Who's Who in the Old Testament in WHO'S WHO INTHE BIBLE 320-21 (1980).
But see EDWARD J. WHITE, THE LAw IN THE ScRIPTURS 38 (1935), which is to the contrary as to
Rebekah, but does not reason from the Jewish tradition.
35 Kaunfer, supranote 34, at 100.
36 WILLIAM NEIL, HARPER'S BIBLE COMMENTARY 57 (paperback ed. 1975); SARNA, supra note
30, at 189.
37 Genesis 20:1-7; 26:6-11.
38 Genesis 25:23; 6 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 27, Numbers, at 809; SONCINO TALMUD, supra
note 31, 4 SEDER NEZiKaN, Abodah Zarah, at 56 (A. Cohen, trans.).
39 SONCrNo TALMUD, supra note 31, 2 SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Bathra, at 85 (Maurice Simon,
trans.).

40 Genesis 28:1; 7 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 27, Deuteronomy, at 20-21 (J. Rabbinowitz,
trans.); SARNA, supra note 30; AMRAM, supra note 31, at 74.
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person, a good person, told a lie. And somehow we, the readers of the
we are not
story, not only continue to admire and imitate the good person,
41
able to exclude the lie from what we admire and imitate.
Finally, a modem story. The most popular of American lawyer stories
is about a good person telling a lie. (My friends would be disappointed in
me if I left this story out.) In this modem story, a lawyer, Atticus Finch, lies
to protect his neighbor Boo Radley from being identified as a hero and
thereby dragged from his seclusion and privacy and subjected to the kindness of the ladies of Maycomb, Alabama. That episode gave Atticus's story
Boo
its title, when his daughter Mary Louise (Scout) said that bringing
42
mockingbird.
a
killing
like
be
would
limelight
civic
the
Radley into
The national Legion of Decency rated movies for observant Roman
Catholics at the time Atticus's story became a movie. The Legion provided
an ethical commentary of its own when it applied sound principles against
lies and against doing evil to achieve good, and rated the story as morally
objectionable. 43 The movie makers had to change Horton Foote's screenplay" so that Atticus became a victim of the lie rather than complicitous in
it. They then got a favorable rating for their movie; good Catholics could
go to it, and let their children go to it, with a clear conscience. But Atticus
would not have agreed with the rating. I think he would have asked the
movie makers to change the name of the story's moral hero when they
changed the story so that it conformed to the Legion's ethical analysis. He
would not have pretended that he did not tell a lie.
What the Legion did was hardly a rabbinical commentary: The Rabbis
did not allow themselves the power to change stories; they sought to find
meaning in the stories they received. There is, however, a modem commentary that may deserve to be considered rabbinical, at least in a metaphorical sense. It came to me personally, from my friend Herbert
Fingarette, a moral philosopher who also, by the way, wrote the seminal
treatise on the morals of self-deception. 45 It would be wrong, he said on
Atticus's behalf, to "treat the virtue of honesty and truthfulness in terms of
an abstract principle to be understood as a logical universal ....

[This

would be] incompatible with the spirit of responding to particular human
beings ....

"4

Fingarette spoke of two necessary disciplines in the business of understanding such a story. First, he spoke of the necessity "to deal with persons
as such." 47 That is, not only do circumstances alter cases, but persons alter
cases. Letwin on Trollope defined the skill for discerning differences
41 It is important, too, with regard to these stories from Jewish Scripture, to notice how
strong the tradition is against falsehood, without much respect for the distinction between false
statements and deceptive statements. See SONC No TALMUD, Sanhedrin, supra note 31, at 617; see
generally BASIL F. HERRING, JEWISH ETHICS AND HALAKHAH FOR OUR TIME (1984).
42 HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 278-79 (Popular Library ed. 1960). Some instances
of my use of the story are in my AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS 3-57; FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS 5-25;
and Growing Up Good in Maycomb, 45 ALA. L. REv. 531 (1994).
43 SHAFFER, supra note 17, at 16-17 (discussing Richard N. Ostling et al., A Scrupulous Monitor
Closes Shop. TIME, Oct. 6, 1980, at 70).
44

HORTON FOOTE, THE SCREENPLAY OF

To

KILL A MOCKINGBIRD

(1964).

45 HERBERT FINGARETTE, SELF-DECEPTION (1969).
46 SHAFFER, supra note 17, at 17 (quoting Professor Herbert Fingarette).
47 1d.
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among persons as the virtue of discrimination: What a virtuous person
does, and when, and to whom, depends on who other persons are. 48
(There may thus be differences among lies to my client's opponent, lies to
the lawyer for my client's opponent, and lies to my client.)
Fingarette's second necessary discipline in understanding a story such
as Atticus's bids us "realize that we cannot rely on logical formulae" when
we come upon the lie of a truthful person, even when, in turning away
from reliance on principle, "we may ... cop out and rationalize a selfserving act as one based on 'moral intuition. "l 4 9 Such, he said, is "our dilemma. And Atticus's ... a man for whom truth is so central. ..

."

It is "his

humbling burden. It would be so satisfying if he could live a life of truthfulness by always telling the truth. No such luck. Truth is more
50
mysterious."
All of this is, I hope, by way of locating the discussion of truthfulness
by lawyers in stories, and in religious moral tradition as it is carried in stories. And all of this is, I suspect, tending to suggest that giving a central
place to the relationships and the communities our stories show us may be
more satisfactory in ethics than giving a central place to analysis of statements. What I have not done so far is attempt to distinguish between Trollope's stories about gentlemen, Bible stories, Atticus Finch's story, and
Curtis's lawyer stories, on the one hand, and the despair that shows up in
lawyerjokes and in the scholarly conclusion that there is no way to practice
law truthfully, on the other. (Professor Lerman's discussion is, by the way,
based on stories told to her by modern American lawyers-which means
that one who uses stories in the way she did, and I am doing, may have to
think about how to distinguish a meaningful story from a story that lacks
meaning,5 1)
I want to suggest that it might be helpful toward exploring that distinction to return to the ethical possibility I suggested at the beginning, a possibility that is given narrative display in these stories: Truthfulness can be
understood not only in reference to statements taken one at a time, but
48 LETWIw, supranote 15, at 69 ("When faced with transgressors, he will consider whether he
is dealing with an eccentric, a ruffian, or a villain.").
49 SHAFFER, supra note 17, at 17 (quoting Professor Herbert Fingarette).
50

1&

51 There is an art and a discipline for deciding what stories are good-that is, truthful in
their description of the good person. See supra note 18. The perception is, no doubt, in large
part intuitive and aesthetic. It is like standing before a painting and admiring the truth in what
the painter has done. It is not an analytical art (although, to be sure, there are those who analyze
paintings, as there are those who analyze stories). Part of the art and part of the discipline are
aspects of faith. That is, the truthfulness of a story is related to its conformity with the "master
story" revealed in Scripture, The religious dimension is developed theologically in MICHAEL
GOLDBERGJEWS AND CHRISTIANS: GETrINO OUR STORIES STRAIGHT (1985), and H"AuERWS, TRUTHFULNESS AND TRAGEDY, supranote 18, at 35. Hauerwas puts a set of tests that turn less on analytical
prowess than on perception. He askS whether the story (1) has power to release its readers from
destructive alternatives; (2) provides ways of seeing through distortions; (3) provides room to
keep its readers from having to resort to violence; and (4) observes a Sense of the tragic-that is,
the conviction that, ultimately, meaning transcends power. I. at 35. Anne Tyler's novels almost
always meet these criteria; crime stories rarely do, mostly because they fail to account for human
evil.
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also in reference to the relationships and the communities on which all
stories rest. We academic ponderers might benefit as much from paying
attention to the human connections we see in our stories as from analysis
of rules and principles and single instances. (Professor Menkel-Meadow's
commentary on Lerman's essay reflects that dependence on stories, I
think.)
Atticus Finch practiced law in a morally sustaining community, and,
within that (as within a smaller concentric circle), in relationships of the
sort Curtis described with the word "intimate." In the moral crisis that followed Bob Ewell's death, Atticus at first refused to lie; the reason he gave
for refusal was concern for his children: "[I]f they don't trust me, they
won't trust anybody.... I can't live.one way in town and another way in my
home."52 After he later lied anyway, he turned to his daughter for understanding and drew necessary comfort in his moral pain from knowing that
she understood. He sought and gained not so much approval of his lie as
Scout's understanding that this was, after all, the sort of thing a good person-a truthful person-might do in such a case. Scout did not announce
a principle in her statement of understanding; she used a narrative analogy: Not to lie would be like killing a mockingbird. Her father's action did
not fit a principle, but it was a fitting thing to do.
I notice, again, how the virtue of discrimination works: Atticus deals
differently, in being truthful, with his daughter, with the Sheriff, who suggested the lie to him, and with his neighbors who are lied to. Earlier in the
episode, when he thought it was his son Jem who had killed Ewell, he refused to lie: It would have been necessary forJem to face the admiration of
the ladies of Maycomb and to be known as a killer, but it was not necessary
53
that Boo Radley go through such an ordeal.
It seems that the story of how a good person lies is like that: Trollope
also described a system of concentric circles, from family to empire, in
which (in his view) trust among Aristotelian friends (gentlemen) was the
moral glue that held Victorian society together.5 4 The biblical stories are
about the survival of a family and a family of families (Israel), and are
thereby another system of concentric circles: It is not so much that Israel
required the lies of Elisha and Rebekah as that Israel understood and survived the lies, the circumstances that led to the lies, and the consequences
of the lies. The same meaning is in Curtis's much shorter stories-evident,
for example, in the pressure shipmates put on one of their own to lie to
save the ship.5 5
52

LEE,

supra note 42, at 276.

53 Atticus may have been wrong about that. From an analysis that considers the overarching
modem ethical value of equality, it might have been better for Boo Radley, a mentally retarded
adult, to be exposed to the community (and better for the community to deal with him face to
face). The reason Jem was treated differently was because he was in training to become the sort
of gentleman his father was. My reflections along these lines are what provoked Fingarette's
rabbinical commentary. See supra note 43.
54 C.P. SNOw, TROLLOPE: His LIFE AND ART 9-18 (1975).
55 "Intimate" relationships within communities are not as clear in the other two Curtis stoies, but imagining such relationships (midrashim) is consistent with the stories and with Curtis's
understanding of them.
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There is a shadow side to this way of understanding how it is that lies
are told by good people-that they come about in reference to relationship and community56-in a system of concentric circles. The shadow side
is in the insight announced by Emile Durkheim and his sociology of deviance: To describe by moral direction a relationship or a community is to
draw boundaries that exclude people.5 7 When a good person lies she
seems to confront and then abuse the dignity of the person she lies to-an
action that offends both the Kantian notion that a human person should
never be used merely as a means to an end, and the ideology that yearns
for a communitarian ethic.
Consider Sissela Bok's pondering of an extreme instance (also illustrated by what Elisha said to the Syrians): Lying to enemies.58 Bok's example was the "elaborate hoax" practiced on Hitler's army by the Allies before
the invasion of Normandy-D-Day, 1944. General Eisenhower and his British and Free French colleagues there successfully deceived the Germans
into thinking that the invasion, which was obviously imminent, would occur
somewhere else. As bad as the beaches of Normandy were, they would
have been much worse had the Germans not been lied to. If that historic
example of a lie told by good persons can be justified, perhaps it can be
used metaphorically to examine other instances of lying from the community, to people who are excluded from the community.
Could Professor Monroe H. Freedman have used General Eisenhower's example when he dealt with the lawyer for the hotel managers who
discriminated against homosexuals? 59 Could a legal-aid lawyer use the
General's example in dealing for poor people with the Immigration and
56 Alasdair MacIntyre and Stanley Hauerwas, writing in medical ethics, speak of modem
American society as a "society of strangers" in which vocational focus is.problematic because the
society in which a vocation is practiced does not envision or nurture a coherent notion of common good. That is (as I understand it), those who function in the society no longer divide up the
territory, so that a professional person can with confidence attend to the matters in which she is
recognized as competent-can no longer trust that other vocations, with other competences, will
see to needs for which she is not competent. STANLEY HAUERWAS, SUFFERING PRESENCE 42-62
(1986); Alasdair MacIntyre, Patients asAgents, in PHILOSOPHICAL MEDICAL ETHICS: ITS NATURE AND
SIGNIFICANCE 197 (Stuart F. Spicker & H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. eds., 1977). Reflecting, as this
paper sometimes does, on the situation of those for whom "strangers" are Hobbesian forces,
claiming the "right" to exploit and consume those who find them both strange and vulnerable, is
an even more ominous prospect. SeeJames H. Hutson, The Emergence of the Modern Concept of a
Right in America: The Contribution of Michael Villy, 39 Am. J. Juus. 185 (1994); see also ARTHURJ.
DYcIr, RETHINKING RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: THE MORAL BONDS OF COMMUNITY (1994); J.
Brian Benestad, RethinkingRights and Responsibilities: The MoralBonds of Community, AMERICA, June
3, 1995, at 27 (book review). It may be possible, for those who are oppressed by the exercise of
Hobbesian freedom by hostile strangers, and for their advocates, to invoke political and legal
notions of rights that respect limits. However, it is always the case that moral claims of right are
more pervasive and less protective than legal claims of right-so that there is an area for law
practice, in which guile rather than law is the substance of practice. Benign Christian andJewish
ethics might, with a different focus, speak of this as an area in which charity, rather than justice, is
the substance of ethical practice: Friends, Aristotle said, have no need ofjustice.
57 See KIM T. ERIESON, WAYWARD PuRITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 1-29
(1966) (discussing EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RuLES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD (1895)).
58 BoK, supra note 14, at 141-53.
59 This story and Professor Freedman's conversation with me about it are what led me to
think about this subject for use at the Hofstra conference. Acceptable Lies, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 20,
1995, at 24.
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Naturalization Service, or with the relentless creditors who design, impose,
and exploit the small claims court system to garnish the wages of the working poor? Professor Freedman and I will not convince anyone that these
opponents are as bad as the armies that occupied France and threatened
Britain sixty years ago, but we could parade familiar horrors, I think, to the
point where people of reason and good conscience would locate oppression, even systematic oppression-and injustice, even systematic injustice.
We might even persuade reasonable people of good conscience to rec60
ognize the presence and persistence of a class system in modem America.
If we got that far-to the point where the practice of law in modem
America could be seen as a theatre for class warfare-we could raise for
consideration an idea Bok borrowed from Machiavelli:
[A] prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by so doing it would be
against his interest.... If men were all good, this precept would not be a
good one; but as they are bad, and would not observe their faith with you,
61
so you are not bound to keep faith with them.

The Machiavellian consideration would be useful because it would let
us talk about the community, or communities, within a class: that is, about
the relationships and communities we lawyers would protect by lying to the
oppressors of such relationships and communities. And then we could
move to the not entirely metaphorical, Marxist use of the notion of class
warfare. We could talk, then, about opponents in war, about D-Day, and
about lying to enemies. Bok borrows from one of Sartre's characters the
apposite use of metaphor in this way: "I wasn't the one who invented lying.
It grew out of a society divided into classes, and each one of us has inherited it from birth. We shall not abolish lying by refusing to tell lies, but by
62
using every means at hand to abolish classes."
I will stop this line of analysis here because what it does is strain for a
principle. Its extremity shows how straining for principles can work. It gets
too far away from my present purpose, which is to notice stories about
good people who tell lies. I will also avoid further description of the moves
from community to class and from oppression to warfare, and say only that
I am persuaded that these are coherent moves just now, even in America,
and that there are some days, in legal-aid practice, when the stories I am in
60 Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Law, History, and the Optionfor the Poor, 6 LOGOS 61 (1985), and ROBERT E. RODES, JR., LAw AND LIBERATION (1986), use such an analysis from Marx by way of Latin
American liberation theology, especially, as to the first, the "new class" theory in MILOVAN DJpLAS,
THE NEW CLASS (1957), and, as to the second, GUSTAVO GUTIERREZ, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION

(1973).
61 BoK, supra note 14, at 143-44. Nonetheless, there are degrees of keeping faith. There is,
for example, a point of view in our warlike culture that says it is better to kill a person than to lie
to him. See 3 THE COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM AND LETTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL 232-35 (No.
58) (Sonia Orwell & Ian Angus eds., Penguin Books 1970) (1968). The argument seems fatuous
to me, as it did to my friend Professor Stephen L. Pepper:
[T] he analogy to World War II was powerful, but I thought too much so: it seemed to
be overkill, to go too far. War justifies far more and far worse than lying. And distin-

guishing the justifiable from the unjustifiable war, or the acceptable from the unacceptable in the conduct of war, are formidable tasks-to say the least.
Letter from Professor Stephen L. Pepper, University of Denver College of Law, to Thomas Shaffer, Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame (Aug. 23, 1995) (on file with author).
62 BOK, supranote 14, at 174-75 (quotingJEAN-PAUL SARTRE, DIRTY HANDS).
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the middle of cause me to find these moves compelling. I do not, however,
make any confessions at present.
There are two huge inhibitions on letting stories lead us to thinking
this way about truthfulness in the practice of law. One is the implicit corollary that one does not lie to those who are not enemies. 63 The other inhibition comes from noticing how the stories show our manifest and
communal tendency to deceive ourselves when we go about deciding who
our enemies are.64 (One might notice, as Professor Freedman has, that
even Atticus Finch, in his community, deceived himself, especially about
the nature and sources of the racism practiced in rural Alabama in 1935.65)
The first inhibition is illustrated by the issue of lying to a professional
friend. If one lies to a person who is within the relationships and communities I have been talking about-and even good people do that sometimesthe ethical issue would likely, involve consideration of benign lies (and
would be beyond what I am attempting here). But lies from one lawyer to
another are, I think, a different case, distinguished from the issue of benign lies by the fact that lies on behalf of one's client are vicarious.
If the metaphorical use of lies to enemies is useful in negotiation between two lawyers, a distinction is needed between the inimical people who
are oppressing my client and the lawyer who represents the inimical people: The clients are enemies; the lawyers are not. The lawyers are professional friends-of one another; lawyers live and work in a community of
lawyers. 66 Even when I sit still and let a legal-ethics class roam freely in the
garden of my Marxist suppositions, I suggest that there is a moral consensus among us that, surely, we lawyers should not lie to (us) other lawyers.
The immediate, pragmatic reasons for not lying to lawyers include
avoiding professional discipline or retaining credibility with other lawyers-both necessary if a lawyer is to be in a position to represent, and
thereby to protect, clients and their relationships and their communities.
(Sometimes, alas, the students' stories provoke me to exceptions.) The
deeper reasons for this collegial inhibition are not pragmatic and analytical. These deeper reasons are as much based in friendship as the lawyer's
faithfulness to her client is. What of these deeper reasons? I hope you will
forgive me for approaching that question in an indirect way, in terms of
what Charles Curtis said about lying to judges:
63 The stories show how a good person does sometimes lie to a friend, but a lie to a friend,
assuming self-deception is under control, does not exclude or abuse the friend. I am not talking
in this paper about the interesting subject of benign lies. See generaly Menkel-Meadow, supranote
7.
64 My present concern for self-deception in identifying enemies is perhaps related to deciding, asJesus did, what to do about enemies;Jesus's teaching assumes that one has enemies. I want
to notice that and also to notice that the perception that someone is my client's enemy may be
the result of clear-sighted realism. I am influenced here by Stanley Hauerwas, No Enemy, No
Christianity: Preaching Between 'Worlds' (unpublished essay on file with author).
65 Monroe H. Freedman, Attikus Finch-Right and Wrong, 45 ALA. L. REv. 473 (1994).
66 See SHArER, supra note 17, at 146-60, 427-33 (discussing the point, from Aristotle, David
Hoffman, and others).
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Curtis said, after he allowed for a lie from one lawyer to another: "[I] t
is inadmissible to lie to the court."6 7 Why? One deeper reason for making
a special case for lawyers who are also judges is the "officer of the court"
tradition. If you pursue that reason very far, though, you tend to make a
god of the state. In this way, Curtis gave what I think is a theologicalreason
for making a special case against lying tojudges: "I take it that it is inadmissible to lie to the court," he said, because "[a] lawyer's duty to his client
cannot raise higher than its source, which is the court."6 8 When I put Curtis's article in my teaching book on American legal ethics, I dropped a foot69
note after that sentence, asking the reader to "[n] ote my puzzlement." I
meant by that footnote to suggest that Curtis's distinction between lies to
other lawyers and lies to other lawyers who are judges is not defensible
ethically, even if it is defensible on more mundane (i.e., pragmatic)
premises.
A lawyer's duty to her client is, I suppose, a moral duty. It comes
about, as Curtis said, because of a relationship as "intimate" (his word) as
those within a family or among friends. Such relationships are not created
by the state, as relationships between judges and other people are. Nor are
the relationships lawyers have with one another. To say that they are created by the state, as Curtis did, is to make the state a substitute for the
Creator. So-that reason for not lying to other lawyers who are judges
won't do, and therefore I would not make a special case for other lawyers
who are judges.
I raise the point to emphasize the distinction between mundane, nonmoral reasons for not lying to other lawyers, including judges, and the
deeper reason that rests in friendship. Curtis had a theological reason that
caused him to distinguish between lawyers and judges. His reason comes
too close to idolatry for me; it is bad theology. But his (as I think) error
gives me a way to explain my own theology on the matter: When I deal
with the lawyer for the other side, who is not my enemy, I deal, within a
community and within concentric circles of communities, with the noblest
work of God, as much as when I deal with my own client. What is present
in both cases is a relationship within a community.
Of course-to get back to the main point of this paper-I also deal
with the noblest work of God when I deal with my client's enemy.70 The
stories do not evade this reality: Elisha, for example, by his deception, led
the Syrian army into a city where they were not harmed; Rebekah had to
face the fact that Esau was her son, and Jacob the fact the Esau was his
brother-and they both did face those facts. Curtis's lawyers had to face
the fact that they were lying to other lawyers-and one of them was willing
to accept discipline from the other lawyers because of the lie.
The difference is that, in the case of dealing with my client's enemy,
and making metaphorical use of General Eisenhower's example, I am dealing across the lines of relationship and community that have historically
67 Curtis, supra note 19, at 7.
68 Id.
69 See SHAFFER, supra note 19, at app. § 13.12 n.4.
70 Jesus spoke about that, if one can assume that what he said about enemies applies to
vicarious enemies.

19961

ON LYING FOR CLIENTS

made a phrase such as "noblest work of God" intelligible.7 1 The present
problem arises because, for a lawyer acting in the sort of case Monroe
Freedman and I talked about, one of the persons I am dealing with, the
other lawyer, is in an important sense within community lines, and the
other, the other lawyer's client, is not. (Particularly not if what we are talking about is oppression and class warfare.)
Professor Freedman's recent discussion of our subject illustrates the
context of negotiation between lawyers. It is a context in which we lawyers
preserve trust and truthfulness among ourselves, and allow for more hostile
confrontation between our respective clients, with a vocational etiquette
that normally allows us to evade and fictionalize so that we do not need to lie to
one another. The complexity of the etiquette is illustrated, I suppose, by
saying that it allows for the possibility of a lie from client to client, through
their lawyers, but not for either lawyer to lie to the other lawyer. It sometimes depends, as Geoffrey Peters noticed years ago, on maintaining a distinction between deceiving somebody and lying to her.72 (But it is, when
considered that way, the practice of analysis.)
In the story Professor Freedman told, his clients sought a four-figure
settlement. He was asked, by the lawyer for the other side, what his authority to settle was (four figures or five?). I thought, as Professor Freedman
and I talked later (Monday morning quarterbacking, to be sure), that the
question was intrusive and that professional etiquette therefore, in that
case, justified evasion and misdirection. If I had been asked whether my
client expected four figures or five, I would have evaded the question in
such a way as to suggest that the answer was five, or at least in such a way as
not to reveal anything at all. 73 When seen as lawyer-to-lawyer etiquette, this
way of looking at deception might be fitted into Professor Menkel71 I borrow the phrase from a litigation story-what I think is the first tax case in the federal
supreme court, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 462-63 (1793). In that case, Justice
James Wilson made the point that the taxpayer is more important, ultimately, than the tax gatherer. His comparison was one made about relationships and within community lines.
72 See supra note 13.
73 See supra note 59. The story also involved a second lie, in which Professor Freedman told

the lawyer for the other side that his clients had not been able to mitigate damages-which, in
fact, they had. I suggested evasion there as well, an example of which would be to say something
like, "We are working on it." I find, in discussing this part of this paper with students and colleagues, that they tend to go along with me on the evasion described in the text, but not on this
second evasion. The reason that comes out of discussion with them is that the fact of mitigation

of damages is a discoverable fact. I don't find that reason persuasive, in view of the fact that the
negotiations Professor Freedman describes were aimed, by both sides, at preventing the litigation
from which discovery might eventuate. But, out of respect for my friends, I limit the point to a

footnote.
Kenneth Kipnis discusses lies to judges in the context of questions asked, in court, byjudges,
of lawyers, which impinge on confidentiality. He wonders whether the relevant principle on confidentiality would permit a truthful answer that is helpful to the client, but would forbid lying to
judges when the answer would not be helpful. He announces the principle that "if it is improper
for attorneys truthfully to answer questions when the truth will hurt a client, it is equally improper to answer when the truth will help." KENNErH KIPNIS, LEGAL ETmics 94-95 (1986).
Machiavelli and Sartre would not be persuaded; neither am I. We have Rule 1.6(a) of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (concerning confidentiality of information) on our side, I think.
More usefully, Kipnis suggests several possibilities for evasion; some of these are at least as harmful as a truthful answer would be, but others fall within the etiquette I suggest in the text. Because evasion is available, Kipnis is able to conclude that "the case for deception cannot be
made." Id. at 95.
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Meadow's reworking of the Golden Rule: I am willing, in using this etiquette, to allow that it can be used on me, if I get too pushy. This is the way
lawyers sometimes talk, and it is justified, among lawyers, even at the edges
of falsehood. A friend and law-school classmate perhaps made this point
when he sent me a reprint of Professor Freedman's essay on our conversation with the note, "A lawyer cannot represent both sides." 74
I also suggested to Professor Freedman, when we talked, that he consult what I think of as the old Catholic casuistry that permits deception
when the question asked is unacceptably intrusive-as, I think, within lawyer etiquette, the question put to him was. When the life-insurance salesman comes to the door and asks, "Is your mother at home?" such casuistry
allows a child to answer, "No," and to think to herself, "Not to you." (Victorian etiquette pursued this reasoning into what lawyers would call a legal
fiction, by giving "at home" a conventional meaning that included what the
child thought but did not say; it was not a lie; it was like what Rebekah did
to Isaac, if you assume that Isaac knew what was going on.)
The practice of this etiquette is a subtle art; the lay public no doubt
excoriates us lawyers for it, even as it practices similar casuistries of its own,
or, more sadly, justifies overt lies when lies are not necessary. (A common
example is deception of those suspected of crime; detective stories-from
75
Sherlock Holmes to James Rockford-depend on deceiving bad people. )
But it is, as much as legal fiction in common-law pleading was, a way for
lawyers to work together truthfully. Lawyers in a peaceful community practice such an etiquette and through it are able to save their clients from the
pain of litigation in something more than ninety percent of all cases.
Lawyers for the oppressed-especially lawyers who act in regimes of
tyrannym-practice such an etiquette in order to remain in practice. 7 6 And
if our lawyer stories tell us nothing else they tell us that it is a good thing
when good people continue to be able to function for the oppressed and
in regimes of tyranny. Our stories tell us that-from the story of Elisha and
the Syrians, to the story of Atticus Finch, to Rebekah's and Jacob's tactics
for avoiding the tyranny that would have been brought to the children of
Abraham if Esau had become their leader. The remarkably hopeful possibility is that modem American lawyers, within such rude necessities, also
might manage an etiquette that supports their being truthful friends.
74 Lest there be confusion: This is distinguishable from a lawyer's making and keeping
promises to another lawyer, although careful lawyers know that it is important to attend to the
exact terms of the promises made, precisely because we are committed to keep our promises to
one another. I suppose that, when Professor Freedman and the lawyer from the hotel arrived at a
settlement, it was effectively sealed by oral promises the two lawyers made to one another.
75 See my discussion in SHAFFER, supra note 17, at 350-61; see also ChristopherJ. Shine, Note,
Deception and Lawyers: Away from a DogmaticPrinciple and Toward a Moral Understandingof Deception,
64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 722 (1989) (discussing deception by police officers and other pursuers of
criminality.) In that situation, Shine says, "a person operating in an official law enforcement
capacity or under equally compelling circumstances needs to be treated differently than the general population." Id. at 738. He proposes amendments to the Model Rules: "[L]ying is sometimes not only ethical but preferred .... " Id.at 752.
76 It becomes plausible, in a tyrannical regime, for the oppressed to regard the tyrant who
oppresses them as an enemy. See Bruce Frohnen, Tocqueoille'sLaw: IntegrativeJurisprudencein the
American Contex 39 Am.J. Jus.
241, 258, 264 (1994).
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Nonetheless: Lying destroys character. It destroys relationships. It destroys communities. Ethical reasoning (whether from analysis of statements or from stories) that justifies lying in rare and extreme cases ("in
crisis" as Sissela Bok has it) is useless unless the warnings on the label are as
stark as that. (I suppose, to linger over that metaphor, that I am arguing in
this essay from the warnings on the label rather than from directions for
use.)
When Bokjustified the hoax the Allies played on the German armyeven there-she warned of all three of these dangers. 77 The ability of the
Trollopian gentleman to lie to save his friend and remain a gentleman lay
in his refusing to lie to himself-and, no doubt, in making sure, before he
lied, that the .issue really was something as grave as his friend's life or death.
Atticus Finch lied and saved his character (Scout said that his story was the
story of a conscience), but we know that the lie brought him pain, and that
he would not easily lie again.
That last point needs underlining: Atticus will not easily lie again.
How do I know that? The answer is that his story is the story of a truthful
person. He was truthful within his community and, more importantly, he
was truthful to himself. The community Atticus lived in was worth saving
from the corrosions of falsehood and was, in that way, like the biblical community of the Hebrew Prophets-worth the truth, and so the Prophets
spoke truth to power-and in it Atticus spoke the truth (with a significant
exception). Even his lie was a lie told in reference to the community; the
77 BoK, supra note 14, at 148-51. Bok's recourse for weighing such judgments is the opinion
of "impartial onlookers." I doubt that there are any. She appeals also to the common good,
which is not the same thing and which is within the ken of onlookers who are not impartial.
Common-good thinking among us does, of course, depend on whether there is at least a vital
remnant of a moral tradition in the Christian West. This is in one sense an empirical question.
One can, in treating it that way, for example, make inferences for ethics from what people say
about their beliefs and practices. Thus, something more than 80 percent of Americans describe
themselves as God-fearing churchgoers. See George Gallup, Jr. &Jim Castelli, Nine of Ten Share a
Beliefin God, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 28, 1987, at B-6; The Gallup Report, Religion in America No.
259 (April 1987); Peter A. Brown, Americans Tend to be Different SouTH BEND TRIBUNE, Apr. 9,
1995, at A-16 (reporting on a survey by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research). The
question can be treated another way, as part intuition, part a sense of history, part a sort of
philosophical anthropology, that says people in our culture are the sort of people who necessarily, by implication from what sort of creatures they are seen to be, hold a common moral tradition. For an example that builds a certain triumphalist mood, and no doubt covers too much:
It is... idle to imagine that relations between North America and Western Europe can
be wholly invigorated by a round of trade talks. To believe that is certainly to do less
than justice to the full range of values and interests that they have in common.
These values and interests reflect what is broadly a common outlook, arising from
broadly the same cultural tradition and directed at broadly the same set of aims and
ideals. They have been responsible for much of the world's present shape. They are not
all noble or immune to criticism. But in the second part of this century they have seen
off fascism and communism, laid the foundations for democracy in countries that had
known little but despotism, and helped to spread prosperity on a scale unsurpassed in
human history.
If North America and Europe can maintain the dynamism of this shared identity,
they can continue to shape the world for the better.
In Need of Fastening,THE ECONOMIST, May 27, 1995, at 16.
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community could not know the truth in that rare instance, but it would
have understood the necessity for the lie. 78
Perhaps I could as easily say the same of a lawyer whose clients are in
one of our hidden communities of undocumented aliens-people the late
Justice Fortas might well have included in his categories of "constitutional
non-persons" in America. 79 Or I could say the same of a lawyer whose client has been bilked a dozen ways, all of them within the law, by car dealers
and finance and insurance companies and small-claims courts. To whom,
H. Richard Niebuhr would ask, is a lawyer responsible in situations like
that? And in what community?8 0 The answers I think I learn from stories
of good lawyers who lie are: I am responsible to my client and to those she
loves. And I am responsible in my client's community.
When is falsehood consistent with that responsibility, in that community? Storytellers tell us not to say "never." Well, then: When? Charles
Curtis said, "I don't know and you are not sure."8' But our stories also say
that lawyers can accept that "humbling burden" and practice law truthfully.
CONCLUSION

Professor Fingarette, after reading an early draft of this paper, wrote
that he had two reasons for feeling insecure about my thesis here (if that is
what it is). "Partly ... there was insecurity because of the intended uncertainty, a crucial feature of your thesis .... And partly I was insecure because the argument of your paper is not as clearly focused as it should
82
be."
I take the criticism seriously. My defense for being obscure, at present,
about an ethical argument, is that I want to point to a source for reflection
rather than to a principle or system. Professor Fingarette honors my objective in this regard when he says, "I end up being induced to reflect at
length, and profitably. 8 3 And that is what I am after. I do not want my
readers here to fasten on some resolution of mine and miss the point of
the paper, which is to invite them to consider stories as a source for ethical
reflection. It could be-probably will be-that a reader of this will find a
different meaning in these stories than I would. That will be because a
reader of stories (and I do not tell stories; I merely point to them) brings
her own story to bear on them and has her own relationships with the
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tellers of the stories.
But, still, I take the criticism seriously. (I have had it from others who
kindly read this manuscript.) If I were to try to come closer to some sort of
78 As my students always do; I have never been able to get them to disapprove of Atticus.
79 The substance and meaning of the notion is in his opinion in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967). I remember the phrase "constitutional non-persons" from a talk he gave at Ohio State
University, in (I think) 1969.
80 H. RIcHARD NIEBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF: AN ESSAY IN CHRISTIAN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
68 (1963).
81 Curtis, supra note 19, at 8.
82 Letters from Herbert Fingarette, Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Santa
Barbara, to Thomas Shaffer, Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame (Aug. 5, 1995 [hereinafter Fingarette Letter, Aug. 5, 1995] & Aug. 17, 1995) (on file with author).
83 Fingarette Letter, Aug. 5, 1995, supranote 82.
84 For my explication of this notion, see SHAFFER, supra note 18, ch. 1.
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focus I suppose it would be this Aristotelian admonition: Raise your children to be truthful people. Tell them stories about truthful people. Hold
up truthful people as examples, and try in your life to be a truthful person
for your children. Your children, formed in the virtue of truthfulness, will
not find analysis of statements and application of principles unimportant;
but they may find such analysis and such principles secondary and provisional, and that will be a good thing. If they should happen some day to
undergo a legal education in modem America, they will then be armed
against the corruption of legal education in modem America.
Beyond that, I can do no better by way of focus than what Professor
Fingarette wrote to me:
[T]here is no neat resolution of the questions, and that is the resolution.... [Y]ou forego complete reliance on principle and analysis, and
instead you found your views on stories and on fundamental personal
character, allowing for situations in which the good person does deceive
or lie. Of course I don't mean that you open this up so that they have a
morally free rein. There are stringent restrictions on such doings. But
life is complex, faithfulness to one's commitments and one's community
may call in very exceptional situations for exceptional means that are
otherwise rarely justifiable, and we have to look ultimately to the person,
to the goodness of character, good will, the spirit of the deed. And we do
you cite that it can occur that good people for good
see in the stories
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reason deceive.

85 Fingarette Letter, Aug. 5, 1995, supra note 82.

